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We analyse a sample of 6 million firm-year observations of large corporations and small
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) spanning 6 European countries from 2005 to 2015, to
determine the impact of leverage and different sources of funding on default risk. We find
that financial leverage has a greater impact on the probability of default of SMEs than of
large corporations. The difference in default probability between the top and bottom leverage
quartiles is 1.24% for large firms and 2.87% for SMEs. This difference may be explained by
the greater exposure of SMEs to short-term debt and their consequently higher refinancing
risk. Indeed, we find that SMEs that recover from the state of insolvency may have similar
leverage to defaulted SMEs; however their liability structure is significantly altered towards
long-term debt and away from short-term debt. Our findings have important implications
not only for bank regulators and policy-makers but also for credit risk modelling.
JEL Codes: G01, G32, G33
Keywords: Default Risk, Leverage, Small and Medium Enterprises, Recovery Probabilities
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I Introduction
Since the seminal works of Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968), academic research has
paid great attention to the determinants of corporate defaults. More recently, Traczyn-
ski (2017) has shown that the only two risk factors that can explain default risk across
all industry sectors are financial leverage and market return volatility. This suggests
that, for unlisted firms, for which stock returns cannot be computed, financial leverage
may be the most important predictor of corporate distress. Indeed, leverage plays a
central role in standard credit risk models used in academia and in industry (Merton,
1974, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein, 2001, Vassalou and Xing, 2004 and Bharath and
Shumway, 2008).
Although several papers have looked at the role of leverage specifically for large firms
(Altman, 1968, Ohlson, 1980, Shumway, 2001, Chava and Jarrow, 2004, Campbell et al.,
2008, Giordani et al., 2014 and Traczynski, 2017) and for small firms (Edmister, 1972,
Altman and Sabato, 2005 and Altman and Sabato, 2007) none, to our knowledge, has
investigated the differential impact of leverage and its components on the default risk of
these two firm types. Yet the factors influencing capital structure decisions as well as
resilience to adverse economic conditions and financing constraints may vary with firm
size. For example, Beck et al. (2008), employing firm-level survey data that include both
small and large firms across 48 countries, find that small firms use less external finance,
especially bank loans. They also show that large credit-constrained firms can more easily
increase external sources of finance than can small firms. The implication is that similar
capital structures may result in different credit risk profiles for small and large firms. A
better understanding of these issues can lead to more accurate default prediction models,
improve lending decisions, and inform government policies aimed at promoting a healthy
small and medium sized enterprise (SME) sector.
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we show that
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leverage has a greater impact on the default probability of SMEs than it does on that
of large firms. To reach this conclusion, we employ a sample of more than 6 million
firm-year observations of large corporations and SMEs spanning 6 European countries
from 2005 to 2015. We estimate probabilities of default (PDs) using a discrete hazard
model to control for common firm-specific and systematic factors. Our data source is
Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis for both types of firms, in order to ensure a degree a consistency
across the balance sheet information used in the analysis. We find that the differential
impact of leverage on PDs across companies of different size is economically important.
The difference in PDs between first and fourth leverage quartiles for large firms is 1.24%,
whereas the difference is more than double, 2.87%, for SMEs. Although higher leverage
always causes higher default risk, the influence of leverage components on such risk varies
between firm groups. Distressed SMEs exhibit higher leverage across all its components
but particularly current liabilities, with a median increase of 15.4% of total assets. This
is likely because current liabilities are a source of financing that may be more easily ac-
cessible to SMEs. The marked increase in short-term (current) liabilities substantially
increases rollover risk and, with it, default risk. In contrast, large firms in distress tend
to increase leverage mainly through non-current liabilities (12.8% of total assets). Hence,
the maturity structure of liabilities appears to explain the differential impact of lever-
age on the PDs of SMEs and large firms. Restricted access to longer-term financing for
SMEs may be due to their perceived riskiness. However, this perception could act as
a self-fulfilling prophecy. As a clear policy implication of our findings, regulators could
attempt to prevent the vicious circle of excessive short-term borrowing leading to higher
default rates by providing SMEs with easier access to longer-term financing.
Our second contribution is an analysis of the influence of leverage on the probability of
recovery from the state of insolvency. Here, as in the Orbis database, “Insolvency” is used
to refer to an intermediate state between the “Active” state and the “Bankrupt” or “In
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liquidation” state. Insolvent firms have the opportunity to restructure and become active
again, thus avoiding liquidation. To date, this transition out of insolvency has been little
investigated in corporate default studies. Indeed, corporate default is normally modelled
as an absorbing state. Yet, understanding the factors that may help a firm’s recovery has
important economic implications.
We find that the maturity structure of liabilities of small firms that exit from insol-
vency is considerably different compared to that of defaulted SMEs. Small and medium
enterprises that recover from insolvency appear to address rollover risk by borrowing more
long term and less short term. As a result, the median non-current debt to total assets
ratio is 15.6% higher, whereas the current debt and trade credit to total assets ratios de-
cline by 7.3% and 8.4%, respectively, relative to SMEs that remain in the insolvency state.
Instead, large firms that recover from default appear to have lower non-current liabilities
and higher current liabilities, which is exactly the opposite, though these changes are not
statistically significant. The findings suggest that SMEs and large firms are subject to
very different restructuring strategies, which may be the result of different bankruptcy
procedures and/or creditors’ bargaining power (Berkowitz and White, 2004 and Berger
and Udell, 2006).
Until recently, the literature on predicting financial distress has mainly focused on
large corporations. Our paper contributes to the expanding research that investigates
default risk in SMEs by focusing specifically on the European market (Filipe et al., 2016
and McGuinness et al., 2018).
The finance literature has investigated firms’ use of trade credit and the effect of reg-
ulatory restrictions on trade credit.1 Barrot (2016), for example, shows that after the
introduction of maturity restrictions on trade credit extended by French trucking firms,
the probability of a trucking firm filing for bankruptcy decreased substantially. Breza
1See, amongst others, Love et al. (2007), Klapper et al. (2012), Aktas et al. (2012), Fabbri and
Menichini (2010), and Murfin and Njoroge (2014).
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and Liberman (2017), on the other hand, provide evidence that similar restrictions on
the maturity of trade credit - such as that which a large buyer in Chile could obtain from
small suppliers - lead to a reduction in trade with small firms. Abdulla et al. (2017) find
that privately held firms rely more on trade credit than do publicly listed companies.
Our findings are in line with those of Molina and Preve (2012), who show that firms
in financial distress tend to use more trade credit than do healthy firms. However, our
findings do not support the conclusions in McGuinness et al. (2018), who suggest that
trade finance may decrease SMEs’ default risk. Instead, we show that trade finance has
a positive and highly statistically significant impact on the default probability of small
and medium firms. This may be because our larger sample enables us to test the impact
of trade finance and other leverage components on defaulted firms directly, rather than
indirectly, via the medium of the Z-score, as in McGuinness et al. (2018).2
Our findings are also related to recent studies that aim to explain capital structure
decisions in European SMEs (e.g. Casey and O’Toole, 2014, Daskalakis et al., 2017,
Mc Namara et al., 2017 and Carbó-Valverde et al., 2016) and earlier ones that focus on
agency problems and information asymmetries in SME financing. For instance, Berger
and Udell (1998) document that, to overcome agency problems, SMEs need to have a
different capital structure to that of larger firms. Berger and Udell (2006) explain how
financial institutions may employ different lending technologies to overcome information
asymmetries when lending to SMEs. Similarly, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006) explain
how different financing tools are needed to fund SMEs and show that SMEs financing
opportunities depend on the development of financial institutions. Casey and O’Toole
(2014) show that financially constrained SMEs use distinct sources of alternative ex-
ternal finance to replace bank credit; whereas trade credit is mainly used for working
capital purposes, informal loans, company loans, market financing, and grants are prin-
2In Appendix A, we explore why our results differ from the those of McGuinness et al. (2018).
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cipally used for investment projects. The substitution effect is larger during economic
downturns (Huang et al., 2011). Carbó-Valverde et al. (2016) show how trade credi-
tors can function as lenders of last resort when SMEs are financially constrained and
cannot access bank lending. This suggests that the different components of financial
leverage may not have the same impact on firms’ PD. Some companies may use trade
credit to spur growth (Ferrando and Mulier, 2013), especially during the first years of a
firm’s life (Robb and Robinson, 2012). However, firms may not get the amount of trade
credit they wish for. Indeed, supply of trade credit is affected by suppliers’ competition
(Chod et al., 2019), suppliers’ bargaining power (Fabbri and Klapper, 2016), product
market power (Goncalves et al., 2018), and supplier-customer relationships (Shenoy and
Williams, 2017).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in Section II we describe the
data; in Section III we outline the empirical methodology and the variables used in our
regressions; and in Section IV we present our results and robustness tests. Section V
discusses the implications of our findings, and Section VI concludes.
II Data
We collect firm-level data from Orbis. We also have access to the financial reports
of firms from the sixteen Western European countries with the largest gross domestic
product (GDP). We exclude financial firms, public sector firms and industries with poor
representation across the countries in the sample.3 We also exclude all firms for which
the industry sector is not provided. We construct the credit history of each firm using
Orbis’s fields “status” and “status date”, which report default information. We exclude
3Specifically, we omit all firms that, according to the NACE Rev. 2 classification, operate in one of
the following industries: financial and insurance activities; real estate activities; public administration
and defence; compulsory social security; activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods
service producing activities of households for own use, and activities of extraterritorial organisations and
bodies.
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all firm-year observations when information on the date on which the “status” is recorded
or on the “status” itself is not available.4 Moreover, we omit all firm-year observations
when accounting variables are not recorded, and we exclude countries in which the total
number of firm-year observations is fewer than 5,000.5 We also exclude countries in which
the percentage of active firm-year observations is higher than 99.99% of the total number
of firm-year observations in that country. Such a high percentage is not plausible and
most likely reflects issues with how Orbis records a firm’s “status” or problems with the
availability of defaulted firm data in that country. For instance, Orbis does not report
the date of default for German firms. Finally, we winsorise all firm-level variables at the
1% and 99% level for each country. Our cleaned database consists of around 6.2 million
observations from almost 1 million firms based in six countries (Belgium, Spain, France,
the United Kingdom, Italy and Portugal) over the time period 2005-2015.
Table 1 reports the number of observations and firms for each country in the sample.
We also differentiate between large corporations and SMEs. The latter are identified as
firms with a value of total assets below e43 million, a threshold based on the European
Commission’s definition of an SME.6 The country with the highest number of firms and
firm-year observations in our sample is Italy, with 34.97% of the total firm-year obser-
vations and 32.16% of firms; Portugal has the smallest number of firm-year observations
(3.85%) and firms (4.77%). The United Kingdom has the largest number of large firms,
and Italy has the largest number of SMEs. Table 1 also shows the percentages of active,
4We also exclude all firm-year observations with a ‘status’ that is active branch, active dormant,
active reorganisation, dissolved demerger, dissolved merger, dissolved takeover, inactive branch, inactive
no precision, non-profit organisations, or unknown situation.
5A subsample with such a low number of firms would not be representative of the country overall.
6The European Commission defines SMEs as firms with fewer than 250 employees. They should also
have an annual turnover of up to e50 million or total assets below e43 million. Information on the
number of employees and turnover is not complete in the Orbis database, so, for total assets, we use the
latter indicator to identify SMEs. We do so to maximise the number of firms in our sample. Figure E.4
illustrates a robustness test in which we restrict the sample to satisfy the conditions in the European
Commission definition. Even with the stricter definition, results remain qualitatively unchanged (see the
discussion in Section IV.a.1).
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insolvent or bankrupt firms. Firms are active if the “status” field on Orbis is Active. They
are insolvent if the “status” field in Orbis is Active default of payment, Active rescue plan
or Active insolvency proceedings. Finally, firms are bankrupt if the “status” field in Orbis
is Bankruptcy, In liquidation, Dissolved, Dissolved bankruptcy or Dissolved liquidation.
Table B.1 provides firm status definitions. Percentages of insolvent and bankrupt firms
vary by country. The heterogeneity is mainly due to the different percentages of large
firms and SMEs in each country and the distribution of firm sizes. For instance, Italy
has the largest cumulative SME bankruptcy rate over the whole sample period, with
14.03%. The country also has a below-average bankruptcy rate for large firms (3.64%).
In contrast, the bankruptcy rate of small and large Spanish firms is remarkably similar,
8.82% and 8.23%, respectively. Section IV.c discusses the possible causes of these country
differences.
Table 2 shows transition rates from the Active and Insolvent states to the other
states. Over 1 year, most of the firm-year observations classified as Active (97.88%) do
not migrate to another state. Only 0.36% go through insolvency procedures, and 1.77%
go directly to bankruptcy. Only 1.01% of Insolvent firm-year observations manage to
recover to the Active state, whereas a large share goes to the Bankrupt state (7.33%).
We also look at 5- and 10-year transition matrices to gain an idea of status changes at
different intervals over the sample period. Multi-period transitions are derived from the
1-year matrix under the homogeneous Markov chain assumption. Table 3 reports the
number of firms that default, namely, firms that become either insolvent or bankrupt,
in each year of our sample period. Percentages are consistently higher for SMEs than
for large corporations. The effect of the global financial crisis is particularly visible for
SMEs. The peak of defaults for both SMEs (2.53%) and large corporations (1.52%) is in
2013 and is associated with the European sovereign debt crisis. From the global financial
crisis onwards, the proportion of defaulted SMEs increases markedly relative to large
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corporations (see the last column of Table 3).
III Empirical Methodology
III.a Model Specification
We estimate the default probability using a discrete hazard model in the form of
a multi-period logit, as in Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008), which can be
used to analyse unbalanced data, such as firm defaults. Bauer and Agarwal (2014) show
that hazard models, which have time-varying covariates, provide superior performance
compared with static, accounting-based models (e.g., Altman, 1968, Ohlson, 1980 and
Zmijewski, 1984) and contingent claim models (e.g., Vassalou and Xing, 2004, Hillegeist
et al., 2004 and Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Our logit model is given by:
Pt(yi,c,j,t+1 = 1) = Φ(α +Xi,tβ +Zi,c,tδ + γc + γj)
=
1
1 + exp[−(α +Xi,tβ +Zi,c,tδ + γc + γj)]
,
(1)
where subscripts i, c, j, and t vary according to firms, countries, industries and years,
respectively. The y variable is a dummy that indicates corporate default; it takes a value
of 0 if the firm is active and a value of 1 if the firm is insolvent or bankrupt. Firms that
remain in default for more than 1 year are retained in the sample used to estimate the
model as depicted in Equation 1 until the year they first migrate to the default state.
The parameter α is the constant; γc and γj are country and industry fixed effects, respec-
tively; X is a vector of time-varying firm-level variables, and Z is a vector of time-varying
control variables. Covariates are lagged and refer to the previous accounting year relative
to the dependent variable.
For all regressions, we report McFadden’s pseudo-R2. We also report the percentage
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of correctly classified Insolvent and Bankrupt observations and the percentage of cor-
rectly classified Active observations. Thresholds to differentiate between correctly and
incorrectly classified observations are derived like in Zhang et al. (2015).
III.b Variables
The firm-level variables include LEVERAGE or its components, that is, TRADE,
CURRENT, and NONCURRENT. These are, respectively, the ratios of total leverage,
trade payables, and current and non-current liabilities to total assets. In our analysis, we
interact these variables with a dummy that identifies SMEs. The SME dummy takes the
value of 1 if the firm has total assets below e43 million and 0 otherwise.
Controls that vary at the country level include a set of macroeconomic variables.7
We employ the natural logarithm of GDP growth (GDP), the yield of 3-month govern-
ment bonds (GOVBOND)8 and the logarithm of sovereign credit default swap (CDS)
spreads (SOVCDS) to capture the business cycle, interest rate effects, and sovereign risk,
respectively. The information on GDP is from the Eurostat Database, interest rates are
collected from the IMF-World Economic Outlook Database and CDS spreads are ob-
tained from Markit. Firm-level control variables include the ratio of net income to total
assets (NITA), the ratio of current assets to total assets (CATA), the number of years
since a firm’s incorporation (AGE), and the SME dummy.
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the independent variables.9 The median
LEVERAGE is higher for SMEs (0.74) than it is for large corporations (0.69). Looking at
the individual components of financial leverage, on the one hand, the median short-term
7Duffie et al. (2007) and Filipe et al. (2016) find that the economic environment influences the probabil-
ity of default. The risk transmission channels from sovereign risk to corporate credit risk are government
guarantees, domestic demand, and credit markets (Bedendo and Colla, 2015).
8The risk-free rate is a key ingredient in the Merton (1974) distance-to-default model.
9The minimum and maximum values of independent variables for large and small firms are the same
because of the winsorisation process by means of which we replace tail observations with either the 1st
or the 99th percentile.
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sources of finance (TRADE and CURRENT) are higher for SMEs (0.15 and 0.27) than
for large firms (0.06 and 0.22).10 On the other hand, NONCURRENT is higher for large
corporations. Table 5 describes the distribution of LEVERAGE, TRADE, CURRENT,
and NONCURRENT at the country level. The table displays heterogeneous financing
patterns which, apart from few exceptions, confirm the general trend observed in Table
4.
To understand the typical capital structure of active and defaulted firms, we check
the levels of leverage and leverage components in the active and default states. Table 6
reports the results. Defaulted firms are always more levered than active ones, a fact that
is true regardless of size. The difference between the median leverage for defaulted and
active large firms is 21.2% and the difference between the median leverage for defaulted
and active SMEs is 21.0% of total assets. The changes in leverage components do appear
to be size dependent. Defaulted SMEs exhibit the largest median increase in current
liabilities (15.4%), followed by trade finance (5.6%), relative to active SMEs. In contrast,
large defaulted firms have the largest variation in non-current liabilities relative to large
active companies (12.8%), followed by current liabilities (7.7%). This suggests that SMEs
in distress are subject not only to higher debt levels but also to higher rollover risk. In-
deed, SMEs in default have both higher trade finance and higher current liabilities than
do large defaulted firms (+15.7% and +11.7%), whereas they have a lower non-current
debt (-14.2%) as a proportion of total assets. This difference in the maturity structure of
liabilities and the resulting greater difficulties in refinancing for SMEs may help explain
why the default rates for SMEs are much higher than they are for large firms even when
controlling for total leverage.
10This evidence is in line with findings of Abdulla et al. (2017), who show that public firms maintain




We estimate default probabilities according to Equation 1 and use four different spec-
ifications. Specification (1) is the benchmark model. In specification (2), we add an
interaction term between leverage and the SME dummy to measure the differential im-
pact of leverage on the default probabilities of SMEs. In specifications (3) and (4) leverage
is broken down into three separate components: trade payables, (other) current liabili-
ties and non-current liabilities. We also calculate the correlations between the regression
variables which are presented in Table 7. When considering the correlations between the
independent variables and the dummy variables for the Insolvent and Bankrupt states,
we observe that NITA has the largest negative correlation, while LEVERAGE has the
largest positive correlation.
Table 8 presents the logit regression estimates for the four specifications. As expected,
the coefficient of LEVERAGE is positive and strongly significant. When we look at the
leverage components in specification (3), they are also positive and strongly significant.
However, the coefficients of interaction terms with dummy variables, such as the SME
dummy, cannot be directly interpreted in a logit model (Ai and Norton, 2003). Hence,
for the sign and significance of leverage and leverage components interacted with SME,
we examine the marginal effects. Appendix C details the calculations of the marginal
effects and Table 9 reports the results. For large corporations, the marginal effect of
LEVERAGE is 0.006. However, for small firms it is twice as much, at 0.012. This means
that a one standard deviation increase in LEVERAGE leads to a 19 basis point increase
in the default probability for large firms, and a 37 basis point increase for SMEs. These
numbers and their differences are economically significant. According to Moody’s, an
increase in the average default rate from 0 to 9 basis points would cause a substantial
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downgrade from Aaa to A. The downgrade could go to Baa, the broad rating category
that separates investment-grade from speculative-grade borrowers, with a 27 basis point
default rate increase (Moody’s Investors Service, 2017). Figure 1 shows the marginal
effects of different levels of LEVERAGE on default probabilities and reveals that changes
in leverage always have a greater impact on the probability of default of SMEs than that
for large corporates. This finding is consistent with the evidence that large financially
constrained firms are able to raise bank finances more easily than are small firms, espe-
cially during crisis periods (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994 and Beck et al., 2008).
The default-risk literature indicates that short-term liabilities may have a greater
influence on default risk than long-term financing. In the popular Merton-based KMV
model (Vassalou and Xing, 2004), the default trigger comprises 100% short-term debt
and only 50% long-term debt, which highlights the relative importance of liabilities with
different maturities. Table 9 confirms this idea, though for SMEs only. Specifically, a one
standard deviation increase of trade payables and current liabilities increases the default
probability by 57 and 66 basis points, respectively. If long-term financial debt instead
increases by one standard deviation, the default probability would rise by 14 basis points
only, which is considerably lower than the sensitivity observed for short-term financing.11
For the average large corporation, all sources of finance have similar importance, with
marginal effects ranging from 7 to 8 basis points. The difference between large corpo-
rations and SMEs may be due to the better ability of large firms to obtain long-term
financing which could flatten the impact of financial leverage of different maturities on
default probabilities. For robustness, we check marginal effects at different quantiles of
the leverage components, TRADE, CURRENT and NONCURRENT, to see whether
their relative impact on the probability of default for SMEs and large firms is sensitive
to the capital structure of the corporation. Table E.1 confirms our main findings. The
11The default probabilities were calculated using the marginal effect in Table 9 and the standard
deviation of Table 6.
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marginal effects of TRADE and CURRENT for SMEs are always larger than those for
large firms across different levels of leverage.
In Table 8, for the McFadden pseudo-R2, we obtain values of 8.90% and 8.91% for
the first two specifications and values of 10.0% and 10.1% for specifications (3) and (4),
respectively. The increment suggests that replacing LEVERAGE with TRADE, CUR-
RENT, and NONCURRENT increases the model’s goodness of fit. Although not high,
these numbers are in line with previous findings on SMEs’ survival probability. For in-
stance, Faccio et al. (2011) estimate a logit model for SMEs’ survival probability and
report a McFadden pseudo-R2 of about 9%. It should be noted that the McFadden
pseudo-R2 cannot be interpreted in the same way as the standard R2 in OLS regres-
sions, that is, as the proportion of explained variance (Hemmert et al., 2018). This is
because the former is based on the ratio of the log likelihood of the fitted model over a
null model. For this reason, we provide additional metrics for the goodness of fit of our
model by computing its accuracy in classifying default and non-default outcomes. For
both outcomes, the classification accuracy is around 70% for all specifications.
For the other control variables used to estimate the PDs of large and small firms, Ta-
ble 8 reports results consistent with expectations: better macroeconomic conditions, as
indicated by a higher GDP growth rate, lower interest rates, and lower sovereign default
risk decrease corporate default rates. For the impact of firm-specific control variables,
first, as one would expect, higher profitability measured by NITA decreases the inci-
dence of default. Second, firm age also causes a contraction of default probabilities since
younger, less-established firms, are well known to be more prone to distress. Finally,
CATA positively affects default risk. Indeed, some items in current assets can be reason-
ably associated with distress risk. For instance, difficulties in obtaining payments from
customer sales will increase trade receivables, and rising inventory stocks may indicate a
slowing demand for the company’s products. Both occurrences would cause current as-
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sets and default risk to increase. However, higher cash holdings, which are also included
in current assets, could indicate a healthier financial position and hence a lower default
probability. To disentangle these effects, we rerun specification (1) on all the above com-
ponents of current assets. Table B.3 shows the results, which confirm our expectations,
with cash exhibiting a negative and statistically significant coefficient, whereas all the
other components have a positive and significant impact on PDs.
A possible explanation for the differential impact of leverage on firms of different
size may be offered by the findings in Campello and Gao (2017). The authors observe
that firms with higher customer concentration face relatively higher interest rate spreads
and/or more restrictive covenants in bank loan contracts. This may increase the riski-
ness of financial leverage. Small and medium enterprises are expected to have a higher
customer concentration because they typically have more limited geographical reach and
market penetration than do large firms. Hence, for the same amount of leverage, their
default risk should be higher relative to large firms, as observed in our study.
To illustrate more clearly the effect of leverage on PDs, we calculate predicted PDs
with our estimated logit model for different leverage quartiles; Table 10 reports the re-
sults. We can observe that an increase of leverage from the first to the last quartile
generates a much larger rise in the PD of SMEs (2.87%) than that of large corporations
(1.24%). For SMEs, the largest increase in the probability of default from the bottom to
the top quartile is caused by current liabilities (2.12%) and trade finance (1.20%). This
result is consistent with that of Cunat (2007), who shows that firms use trade credit as
a marginal source of finance and that firms that rely on trade credit have to pay higher
interest rates. On the other hand, in line with the previous findings reported in Table
6, trade credit has a relatively lower effect on the PDs of large firms, and this effect
decreases slightly when moving from the bottom to the top trade-credit quartile.
A limitation of our analysis is that we do not account for loan contract features.
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Cumming et al. (2019) point out that loan features, such as collateral requirements and
other covenants, are often used to reduce the riskiness of private loans and increase their
marketability. This may attract more investors in the private loan market, lead to more
competitive loan pricing, and perhaps reduce the riskiness of financial leverage.
IV.a.1 Robustness
We perform a battery of robustness tests on our main results by using specification (2)
as a benchmark model. We check that our findings are not driven by zero or low-leverage
firms. These firms have a different capital structure, profitability, dividend payout policy
(Strebulaev and Yang, 2013), and corporate culture (El Ghoul et al., 2018). We run
specification (2) excluding all observations in the bottom 10% of the LEVERAGE distri-
bution. Figure E.1 reports the results, which are very similar to those reported in Figure
1, confirming that our conclusions are robust to the exclusion of low-leverage firms.
Furthermore, it is conceivable that the impact of LEVERAGE on default probabil-
ities is non-linear (Giordani et al., 2014). For this reason, we also run specification (2)
and include a quadratic term for LEVERAGE and its interaction with the SME dummy.
Figure E.2 shows the resulting marginal effects, and, again, the differentiation between
large firms and SMEs is consistent with previous findings.
We also consider insolvent and bankrupt firms separately, in contrast to the main
analysis where they were bunched together as defaulted companies. We expect firms that
will face bankruptcy, namely, those that will be liquidated and will not be able to recover
from default, to be more sensitive to leverage. We use an ordered logit model; Figure E.3
shows the results. The lines in the figure relate to changes in the probability of retaining
the Active state or migrating to the Insolvent or Bankrupt states when leverage changes.
Bankrupt firms have the largest marginal effects, which are also statistically significantly
different from those of insolvent firms. The marginal effects of the Active state decline
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as the probability of remaining active falls when leverage increases.
We also check that our results are not driven by our SME definition. The European
Commission defines SMEs as those firms that have fewer than 250 employees and either
no more than e50 million of turnover or no more than e43 million of total assets. To
maximise the sample size, in our analysis, we have considered SMEs to be all firms with
total assets below e43 million. This is because the Orbis database does not always report
turnover and the number of employees. As a robustness test, we restrict the analysis to
the subsample of firms for which turnover and the number of employees are available.
Figure E.4 shows marginal effects computed on the restricted sample using specification
(2). The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Figure 1, where the full
sample is used.
To check that our analysis is not driven by a dominant country or sector, we rerun
our regressions excluding Italy and the retail sector, which have the largest number of
observations. Figure E.5 shows the marginal effects when Italy is excluded, and Figure
E.6 shows marginal effects when the retail sector is excluded. Our main conclusions re-
main unchanged.
In addition, we want to verify whether our findings are driven by a specifically
sized subsample within the SME grouping. Thus, we run specification (2) interacting
LEVERAGE with dummies that capture small and medium firms separately.12 Figure
E.7 presents the results and confirms that the sensitivity of the default probability to
leverage decreases monotonically with size.
Other factors can affect large corporation and SME defaults, potentially altering the
effect of LEVERAGE. To control for Europe-wide changes in market conditions, we add
time fixed effects to specification (2). Figure E.8 shows that the sensitivity of the default
12The small dummy takes a value of 1 if the firm has less than e10 million in total assets, and the
medium dummy takes a value of 1 if total assets are between e10 and 43 million, based on the European
commission definition.
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probability to leverage is not affected by time fixed effects.
Previous research has highlighted that the presence of public sector-sponsored credit
guarantee schemes for small businesses affects firms’ default risk (Mayordomo and Rodŕıguez-
Moreno, 2018 and Wilcox and Yasuda, 2019). To capture this type of government in-
tervention, we extend our analysis by considering the number of measures taken by each
country and in each year of the sample to support local SMEs as a result of the EU’s
2008 Small Business Act (SBA). One of the main objectives of the SBA has been to
boost SMEs’ funding opportunities by “facilitating SMEs’ participation in public pro-
curement and ensuring better access to State Aid” and by “facilitating SMEs’ access to
finance” (European Commission, 2018, p. 158). Following the European Commission’s
report, we employ the number of SBA-related policy interventions enacted by each coun-
try in each year from 2011 as an indicator of government support for SMEs. We add a
dummy to specification (2) to identify country-years when the number of interventions
is above the median number of interventions across all country-years in the sample. We
also interact the dummy with leverage.13 Figure E.9.a shows the marginal effects when
the SBA dummy is taken into consideration. The results confirm that the sensitivity of
the default probability to leverage is higher for SMEs than it is for large firms. Panel
A of Table E.2 shows fitted probabilities of default for large corporations and SMEs in
country-years with the number of SBA interventions below and above the median across
all country-years. Firms in country-years with a high number of SBA interventions enjoy
lower default probabilities, as one would expect. However, even when we control for this
effect, the differential impact of leverage for large corporations and SMEs remains.
Cosh et al. (2009) show that corporations are more likely to seek external finance than
are partnerships and sole proprietorships. To capture the different management propen-
sities to increase leverage, we run specification (2) by adding a dummy variable that takes
13The time period is restricted to 2011-2015 like in table 35 of European Commission (2018).
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a value of 1 if the firm is a partnership or a sole trader, and 0 otherwise. We also add the
interaction between the partnership/sole trader dummy and LEVERAGE. Figure E.9.b
presents the marginal effects when partnerships and sole traders are differentiated from
other firms. Again, the higher sensitivity of small firms to leverage holds. Moreover,
Panel B of Table E.2 shows that, in line with our main findings, marginal effects on
default probabilities increase with leverage and that the increase is higher for SMEs than
for large companies. Furthermore, SMEs that are sole traders and partnerships exhibit
a lower default probability than do other SMEs across different levels of leverage.
Not all firms obtain the amount of external finance they desire (Cosh et al., 2009).
Leverage may play a different role in financially constrained firms. We perform a fur-
ther robustness test to check whether financial constraints nullify the differential impact
of leverage on the probability of default. We identify firms that are more likely to be
financially constrained using a disequilibrium model (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009 and
Carbó-Valverde et al., 2016).14 Then, in specification (2), we insert a dummy that takes
a value of 1 if the firm has a probability of being financially constrained above the sam-
ple median, and 0 otherwise. To capture constrained firms, we use the interaction term
between the dummy and LEVERAGE. Table E.2 confirms our main results, and Panel
C shows that fitted default probabilities increase with leverage. The increase is higher
for SMEs than it is for large companies. These results are confirmed for both financially
constrained and unconstrained firms, though the former group of firms, as expected, has
a higher default probability. Figure E.9.c reports marginal effects, which are obtained by
controlling for the probability of being financially constrained. The marginal effects are
in line with the previous findings.
Finally, for fast-growing firms, external debt finance might not be preferred over
14The only difference between our estimation and that of Carbó-Valverde et al. (2016) (Table 2, column
1) is that we substitute Sales/Total Assets with EBIT/Total Assets. We do so because the Orbis database
does not provide information on sales for UK firms.
18
equity-type instruments (Cumming, 2005). Therefore, LEVERAGE may not have the
same impact on firms that are quickly expanding their activities. We perform two ro-
bustness tests to determine whether the differential impact of leverage on default risk
is present in both fast- and slow-growing firms. In the tests, we add a dummy to spec-
ification (2) to identify firms that have above-median growth and an interaction term
between the growth dummy and LEVERAGE. As growth proxies, we alternatively use
the rate of change of net income and the rate of change in total assets. Our main re-
sults are confirmed. Panels D and E of Table E.2 show that fitted default probabilities
increase with leverage and the increase is higher for SMEs than it is for large companies.
These results hold for both slow- and fast-growing companies. In addition, fast-growing
companies have lower default probabilities, as expected. Figures E.9.d and E.9.e report
marginal effects that are also consistent with previous inferences.
IV.b Sector Variation
In this section, we investigate how financial leverage affects probabilities of default
in different industries. We group our observations into five sectors: production, retail,
services, construction, and transportation.15 We run specification (2) separately for each
sector. Figure 2 shows that marginal effects16 vary by sector, although the effect for
SMEs is always higher than the effect for large corporations. In the production, retail,
and transportation sectors, marginal effects for large corporations do not exhibit much
15We assign firms to (1) the production sector if the NACE Rev. 2 code is agriculture, forestry and
fishing; mining and quarrying; manufacturing or electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; (2)
the retail sector if the NACE Rev. 2 code is wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and mo-
torcycles; (3) the services sector if the NACE Rev. 2 code is water supply; sewerage, waste management,
and remediation activities; accommodation and food service activities; information and communication;
professional, scientific, and technical activities; administrative and support service activities; education;
human health, and social work activities; arts, entertainment, and recreation or other service activities;
(4) the construction sector if the NACE Rev. 2 code is construction; and (5) the transportation sector
if the NACE Rev. 2 code is transportation and storage.
16The estimated coefficients of logit regressions for each sector, country and time period are available
on request.
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sensitivity to the level of LEVERAGE, whereas for SMEs marginal effects exhibit a clear
positive slope. In contrast, in the construction sector, marginal effects sharply increase
with LEVERAGE for both firm types. At the opposite end of the spectrum lies the
services industry, in which marginal effects are low and do not significantly change with
LEVERAGE.
IV.c Country Heterogeneity
Figure 3 shows the marginal effects computed with specification (2) estimated sep-
arately for each country in our sample. The results are highly heterogeneous across
countries. In France and Portugal, LEVERAGE increases the probability of default of
both SMEs and large corporations, but the latter not as strongly. In Italy and Spain,
LEVERAGE increases the probability of defaults for both SMEs and large firms in a sim-
ilar manner, though the effect for both types of firms is more pronounced in Italy for high
levels of leverage. Oddly, in the United Kingdom, LEVERAGE appears to have a small
impact on probabilities of default regardless of firm size. Interestingly, large Belgian firms
exhibit a negative relationship between leverage and PDs, with higher leverage leading
to a decrease in PDs (though the decrease is lower as leverage increases). Bruggeman
and Van Nieuwenhuyze (2013) discuss the peculiar resilience of Belgium during both the
Great Recession and the European sovereign debt crisis and offer clues that may explain
this puzzling result. Specifically, they illustrate that a substantial increase of corporate
leverage was not the result of funding needs but rather of financial flows from Belgian
multinational companies to local firms for tax-saving purposes.17 This explains why an
17Bruggeman and Van Nieuwenhuyze (2013), pp. 65-66, state that “the debt accumulation of Belgian
firms is also determined partly by various specific factors attributable to the tax environment. For
instance, in Belgium there are considerable funding flows between non-financial corporations, on account
of the activities of non-financial holding companies and finance companies of multinationals based in
Belgium. These companies were previously attracted by the tax concessions available to coordination
centres and, since 2006, by the notional interest allowance. Since 2005, the loans granted by related
foreign firms to firms based in Belgium have risen by 17 percentage points of GDP to 37% of GDP at the
end of 2012, accounting for much of the rise in the consolidated debt ratio, up by 26 percentage points of
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increase of leverage did not affect default risk. In fact, rather the opposite, because debt
accumulation took place when Belgian companies were performing well.
One of the possible sources of this observed heterogeneity is the variability of the
capital structure of SMEs and large corporations across the countries in our sample (see
Table 5). Moreover, heterogeneities may be due to the fact that the relative importance
of industry sectors changes across countries. Indeed, as discussed in Section IV.b, firms
in different industries exhibit rather different default patterns (Nickell et al., 2000) and
different marginal effects of leverage on default probabilities (see Figure 2). This evidence
may help explain the variations in the marginal effect of leverage across countries (see
Figure 3). For instance, the graph with the marginal effects of leverage for the United
Kingdom may reflect the prominence of the service sector, for which default probabilities
may react less to changes in LEVERAGE.
Another explanation for the heterogeneous link between default probabilities and
financial leverage may be traced to different bankruptcy codes, degrees of creditors’ pro-
tection (Davydenko and Franks, 2008), and different degrees of investors’ legal protection
(La Porta et al., 1998). The same holds true for SMEs (Mc Namara et al., 2017). There
is conflicting evidence regarding the impact of creditor protection laws on financial lever-
age and credit risk. For instance, Claessens and Klapper (2005) claim that the number
of bankruptcies increases in countries with stronger creditor rights and greater judicial
efficiency. In contrast, Acharya et al. (2011) find that firms in countries with stronger
creditor rights have lower cash flow risk and lower financial leverage.18 To reconcile
these different observations, Heitz and Narayanamoorthy (2018) point out that different
creditor-right laws, such as that assuring that secured creditors are paid first in case of
GDP during that period. Rather than being due to an actual demand for funding on the part of firms,
that debt accumulation therefore originates from financial flows aimed at optimum tax efficiency.”
18Other recent contributions include Qian and Strahan (2007), Bae and Goyal (2009), Ferrando et al.
(2017), Sautner and Vladimirov (2017), Shah et al. (2017), Boyd et al. (2018), Fernández et al. (2018),
and Houston et al. (2010).
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default and that creditors have the power to restrict reorganisation, have different effects
on default probabilities and recovery rates.
We perform two new robustness tests following Djankov et al. (2007) and Heitz and
Narayanamoorthy (2018) to distinguish countries with strong creditor rights from those
with weaker rights. In the first test, we insert a dummy in specification (2) to identify
firms in countries where absolute priority is respected, that is, where secured creditors are
paid first, and an interaction term between the creditor rights dummy and LEVERAGE.
In the second robustness, test we redefine the dummy to identify firms in countries where
creditors can impose restrictions on reorganisation, for instance, when reorganisation is
subject to creditors’ consent. Table E.2, Panels F and G, confirms our original results.
With both indicators of creditor rights, default probabilities increase with leverage, and
the increase is steeper for SMEs than for large firms. In countries in which secured cred-
itors are paid first, the probability of default may go up, as (a) secured creditors may be
willing to lend to riskier borrowers, and (b) secured creditors have an incentive to initiate
bankruptcy procedures as their claims are better protected in those countries (Heitz and
Narayanamoorthy, 2018). Indeed, our findings suggest that PDs are higher in countries
where secured creditors are paid first, but only when leverage is low. At a high level
of leverage, we find the opposite result. This suggests that firms with higher leverage
may reduce risk if they are based in countries with strongly secured creditors in order to
decrease the chances of being forced into bankruptcy by such creditors. This incentive
to reduce risk would be stronger for high leverage firms because, all else being equal,
they would be closer to default than lower leverage firms. The lower risk of borrowers in
countries with higher creditor rights has been documented by Acharya et al. (2011).
In terms of the right of creditors to restrict reorganisation, the expectation is that
PDs will be lower in countries that warrant that right. This is because debtors will put
more effort into avoiding default as they would be more likely to face liquidation rather
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than reorganisation. This is in line with our findings but only for higher leverage firms.
At lower leverage, countries with reorganisation restrictions have higher PDs. A possible
explanation of this puzzling result is that creditors in those countries might strategically
preclude reorganisation to force the borrower into liquidation which is more likely to
increase the amount recovered by the creditors when leverage is lower.
IV.d The Financial Crisis
The 2007-2008 financial crisis affected the availability of credit in European countries.
During this period, financially constrained firms increased trade credit (Garcia-Appendini
and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013, Carbó-Valverde et al., 2016). Trade credit is a short-term
source of finance and, therefore, tends to be riskier (Vassalou and Xing, 2004, He and
Xiong, 2012). Campello et al. (2010) also show that firms that experienced financial
constraints because of the 2007-2008 crisis reduced investments and were forced to cut
planned projects. Daskalakis et al. (2017) show that SMEs adjust their long-term debt
ratios more slowly during crisis periods. Hence, financial crises may affect firms’ debt
management. Thus, it is interesting to investigate whether there have been significant
changes in the sensitivity of default probabilities to financial leverage during crisis peri-
ods.
We run specification (2) for three sub-periods: the pre-crisis (2005-2006), Great Re-
cession (2007-2009) and European sovereign debt crisis and recovery (2010-2014) periods.
Figure 4 presents the results. The marginal effects suggest that the difference between
large firms and SMEs with regard to their PD sensitivity to leverage becomes more pro-
nounced as we move from the pre-crisis period to the Great Recession. This is mainly
because of SMEs’ PDs becoming more sensitive to leverage, while the marginal effects of
large firms remain rather flat. In contrast, in the European sovereign debt crisis, both
marginal effects are upward sloping and higher than in previous periods.
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IV.e Recovery Probabilities
In this section, we investigate the capital structure of firms that become insolvent and
then recover relative to those that do not recover. Hence, we explore the determinants
of the probability of recovery from the state of Insolvency. A clear pattern emerges
from Table 11: whereas defaulted and recovered SMEs have similar levels of leverage,
those that do recover exhibit markedly lower short-term debt and substantially higher
long-term debt. Specifically, when firms move from Insolvent to Recovered, trade credit
falls by 8.4% and current liabilities fall by 7.3%, while non-current liabilities increase by
15.6% (Panel B). All of the results are highly statistically significant. This suggests that
a recipe for recovery is to seek more stable sources of funding and not necessarily decrease
leverage, which may not always be possible. Hence, decreasing rollover risk may be key
to restoring viable operating conditions.
The results for large firms have either no or low statistical significance due to the
small sample of large recovered firms (only 17). For this reason, we restrict the subse-
quent analysis of the determinants of the recovery probabilities to SMEs. Table 12 reports
the estimation results. Specification (1a) includes leverage as an independent variable. It
shows that leverage contributes positively to the chances of a firm’s recovery. In specifica-
tion (2a) leverage is broken down into three separate components: trade payables, (other)
current liabilities and non-current liabilities. Specification (2a) confirms that recovery is
more likely when non-current liabilities increase. The stability and maturity structure of
liabilities appear to make a difference between remaining in or exiting the default state.
An alternative explanation is that a small firm that is able to raise long-term finance
will have a higher probability of surviving an insolvency procedure. This may be because
SMEs with longer-term financing have gone through strict screening procedures.
Considering the other determinants, a better economic and financial environment, as
indicated by higher GDP and lower interest rates, improves recovery probabilities. In-
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terestingly, higher sovereign risk (SOVCDS) also appears to help recoveries. This may
simply indicate that following the height of a crisis, when the economy has bottomed out
and sovereign spreads are still larger than normal, SMEs may find better conditions to
emerge from distress. This also would be reinforced by typical post-crisis governments’
and regulators’ policies aimed at supporting the SME sector (OECD, 2009, Bergthaler
et al., 2015, Mayordomo and Rodŕıguez-Moreno, 2018).
Finally, using the estimated recovery probability models, we derive predicted recovery
probabilities for different quartiles of leverage and its components. The results reported
in Table 13 confirm the above conclusions and show that an increase in long-term debt
(NONCURRENT) from the bottom to the top quartile improves the probability of recov-
ery of SMEs by 2.24%. In contrast, higher short-term debt (TRADE and CURRENT)
causes the recovery probability to decrease.
V Applications in Banking
In this section, we explore possible applications of our estimated default probabil-
ity models. Specifically, we look at the differential impact of leverage on bank capital
requirements and loan pricing for large versus small and medium borrowers.
V.a Basel III Capital Requirements
We derive capital requirements using the internal rating-based approach in Basel
III (see Appendix D) for a 1-year pure discount loan worth $1 at maturity. Other than
maturity and loan exposure, the capital requirement depends on the loan PD, its expected
loss-given default (LGD), and borrower size. We consider average PDs for the first and
tenth decile of our sample of firms ranked according to leverage. The LGD is taken from
Moody’s Investors Service (2017) which provides bank loan recoveries. We compute the
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LGD as 1 minus the average corporate loan ultimate recovery over the period 1987-2016
(80.6%), which gives an LGD of 19.4% (see exhibit 8 in Moody’s Investors Service, 2017).
Firm size is measured using annual sales. The Basel III assumption is that the smaller
the firm, the lower its correlation with the rest of the bank portfolio. The maximum
correlation difference between large and small firms is 4%, which is achieved for SMEs
with annual sales below e5 million. Table 14, Panel A, reports the minimum capital
requirements calculated using the above assumptions. In line with our previous results,
the PD of SMEs is greater than that of large firms and the difference increases with
leverage. For low leverage (first decile), the SME default probability (0.76%) is 1.23 times
that of large firms (0.62%). When leverage is high (tenth decile), the factor increases by
2.25 times, from 2.55% to 5.74%.
When we hold the correlation constant across large firms and SMEs so that only the
PD effect is present, regulatory capital also rises, as one would expect, but with lower
multiples (1.11 and 1.34 for low and high leverage, respectively). However, when we
consider the correlation discount given to small SMEs as defined by Basel (on average, the
SMEs in our sample belong to this category), the capital requirement of SMEs becomes
smaller than or similar to the capital requirement of large firms (the multiples are now
0.87 and 1, respectively). This is clearly at odds with the evidence presented in Table 3,
where we show that default rates for SMEs are larger than for large firms in each year of
the sample. Those rates represent the combined effect of default risk (PD) and correlation
as they indicate the aggregate default risk of the portfolio of firms in our sample.
Our results are intuitive and highlight a potentially serious drawback of the current
regulations. Although it might be defensible to assume that portfolio correlation declines
with firm size in normal market conditions, this assumption clearly does not hold in
crisis periods, when SMEs are more likely to experience distress, for example, because of
restricted access to credit (see, for instance, Ferrando et al., 2017). Indeed, the results
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in Table 3 show that since 2008, the ratio of SME defaults to large firm defaults has
increased and has remained higher than in the pre-crisis period.
V.b Loan Pricing
To illustrate the effect of leverage on the pricing of loans to SMEs and large firms,
we adopt an approach similar to that of Resti and Sironi (2007).19 The loan spread is
decomposed into an expected loss component (del) and an “unexpected loss” component
(dul). The former, for a 1-year pure discount loan worth $1 at maturity, is obtained from
the following equation:




1 + rf + del
. (2)
We assume that the unexpected loss component of the spread is driven by the risk pre-
mium (re − rf ) paid by the bank for the regulatory capital allocated to the loan, as
a percentage of the loan exposure (RegCap). The term “unexpected loss” is derived
from the Basel III regulations, where equity capital requirements for credit exposures are
meant as to act as buffers to absorb the value-at-risk of the loan not already covered by
the loan loss provisions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2017). Details of the
capital requirement calculations are shown in Appendix D. dul can be derived from the
following equation:
1− LGD · PD
(1 + rf ) +RegCap(re − rf )
=
1
1 + rf + del + dul
. (3)
We normalise the risk-free rate (rf ) to 0. re is the bank’s cost of capital and is set to
13.66%. This is computed as the average cost of equity capital of the four main banks
for each country in our sample as of 31 December, 2014. Bank-specific costs of equity
have been sourced from Bloomberg.
19See Chapter 15, pp. 451-457.
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We divide our sample into deciles based on leverage and compute loan spreads and
their components for the first and tenth deciles. Table 15 reports the results. We can
see that, at low leverage, the spread differential between large firms and SMEs is close to
zero. However, the spread difference increases to 63 basis points at high leverage, with
the SME spread (1.65%) 1.62 times that of large firms (1.02%). Another way to look at
this is to check the leverage effect for the two types of firms separately. We can observe
that, in large firms, loan spreads at high leverage are 2.49 times those at low leverage,
a difference of 0.61%. However, the jump for SMEs is much more pronounced, with a
multiple of 4.13 and a difference of 1.25%. This evidence reinforces the importance of the
leverage effect and firm size for lending rates.
As a robustness test, in Table E.3 we present a sensitivity analysis based on alternative
values for the cost of capital. The results are broadly in line with our previous findings.
VI Conclusion
We focus on the role of financial leverage and its differential effect on the probabil-
ity of default of SMEs and large corporations. We find that leverage and each of its
components, including trade finance, current, and non-current liabilities, positively affect
default probabilities. However, this impact is stronger for SMEs, especially in relation to
short-term financing. The implication is that the rollover risk associated with short-term
financing and restricted access to other sources of debt funding make SMEs more prone
to default than are large firms. In addition, we observe that, to recover from default,
SMEs need to rely less on short-term debt and more on longer-term liabilities. The up-
shot is that the maturity structure of liabilities appears to be a key ingredient to the
health and stability of SMEs. Therefore, a clear direction from our research for future
government policies aimed at increasing the resilience of SMEs, particularly during crisis
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periods, would be to create incentives for banks to extend longer-term credit to the SME
sector. Indeed, SMEs’ perceived higher default risk may be partly the result of short-term
lending policies that create the pre-conditions for that very risk to materialise.
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Table 2: Transition Matrix
The table shows transition probabilities for Active and Insolvent states to Active, Insolvent, and Bankrupt
states over 1 (Panel A), 5 (Panel B) and 10 years (Panel C). Firms are Active if their Orbis “status”
is Active; Insolvent if their Orbis “status” is Active default of payment, Active rescue plan, or Active
insolvency proceedings; and Bankrupt if their Orbis “status” is Bankruptcy, In liquidation, Dissolved,
Dissolved bankruptcy, or Dissolved liquidation. Values in the table are expressed as a percentage. The
sample period ranges from 2005 to 2015.
statet \ statet+n Active Insolvent Bankrupt
Panel A: n = 1 year
Active 97.876 0.358 1.766
Insolvent 1.012 91.657 7.331
Panel B: n = 5 years
Active 89.852 1.448 8.700
Insolvent 4.089 64.718 31.19
Panel C: n = 10 years
Active 80.793 2.239 16.968
Insolvent 6.320 41.944 51.736
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Table 3: Number of Defaults
This table reports the number (and percentage) of insolvent and bankrupt firms for each year of the
sample. The percentages (in parentheses) are computed for the total number of firms in each year.
Sample firms are then split into two sub-samples: SMEs and large corporations. If the value of a firm’s
total assets is no greater than e43 million, the firm is classified as an SME; otherwise, it is classified as a
large corporation. The table displays the number (and percentage for each sub-sample) of insolvent and
bankrupt firms that are SMEs and large corporations. The last column is the ratio of the percentage of
defaulted SMEs to the percentage of defaulted large corporations.
a = %SMEs%LargeCorporations .
Years Overall sample SMEs Large firms a
N. (%) N. (%) N. (%)
2006 7,159 1.359 6,906 1.362 253 1.284 1.061
2007 8,146 1.395 7,879 1.404 267 1.166 1.204
2008 11,702 1.894 11,393 1.920 309 1.263 1.521
2009 14,731 2.316 14,486 2.370 245 0.980 2.418
2010 13,276 2.061 12,972 2.095 304 1.216 1.723
2011 14,030 2.131 13,763 2.175 267 1.049 2.073
2012 16,196 2.428 15,934 2.484 262 1.024 2.425
2013 16,617 2.491 16,232 2.530 385 1.516 1.669
2014 13,674 2.082 13,380 2.119 294 1.158 1.829
2015 7,516 1.339 7,389 1.369 127 0.586 2.334
Total 123,047 13.078 120,334 13.132 2,713 6.233 2.107
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for the Regression Variables
This table shows summary statistics for the independent variables used in our regression analysis. The
first three are country-specific variables: GDP is the 1-year GDP growth rate; GOVBOND is the 3-
month government bond interest rate; SOVCDS is the logarithm of the government CDS spread; NITA
is the ratio of net income to total assets; CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets; AGE is the
number of days since incorporation divided by 365; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets; TRADE is the ratio of trade payables to total assets; CURRENT is the ratio of current liabilities
(minus trade payables) to total assets; and NONCURRENT is the ratio of non-current liabilities to total
assets. GDP, GOVBOND and SOVCDS are reported for the whole sample of firm-year observations.
NITA, CATA, AGE, LEVERAGE, TRADE, CURRENT, and NONCURRENT are reported for large
corporations and SMEs. A firm-year observation is classified as an SME if a firm’s total assets are worth
no more than e43 million. The total number of firm-year observations is 6,236,922. The number of
firm-year observations for large corporations is 241,033. The number of firm-year observations for SMEs
is 5,995,889. The sample period ranges from 2005 to 2015.
Mean Median SD Min Max
GDP (%) 0.309 0.652 2.497 -7.101 4.223
GOVBOND (%) 1.759 1.244 1.571 -0.073 6.750
SOVCDS (%) -0.776 -0.359 1.647 -4.375 2.443
Large firms
NITA 0.022 0.015 0.102 -0.973 0.631
CATA 0.533 0.554 0.322 0.001 1.000
AGE 25.656 20.066 20.736 0.427 104.849
LEVERAGE 0.664 0.691 0.321 0.002 4.470
TRADE 0.122 0.064 0.154 0.000 0.917
CURRENT 0.290 0.224 0.251 0.000 1.927
NONCURRENT 0.249 0.135 0.287 0.000 2.616
SMEs
NITA 0.026 0.017 0.108 -0.973 0.631
CATA 0.689 0.775 0.279 0.001 1.000
AGE 17.349 14.238 13.618 0.427 104.849
LEVERAGE 0.709 0.739 0.306 0.002 4.470
TRADE 0.205 0.151 0.204 0.000 0.917
CURRENT 0.320 0.266 0.245 0.000 1.927
NONCURRENT 0.182 0.096 0.229 0.000 2.616
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Table 5: Sources of Finance across Countries
This table shows summary statistics for the variables representing the alternative sources of finance
across the countries represented in the sample. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets; TRADE is the ratio of trade payables to total assets; CURRENT is the ratio of current liabilities
(minus trade payables) to total assets; and NONCURRENT is the ratio of non-current liabilities to
total assets. Bold numbers are the maximum mean values of LEVERAGE, TRADE, CURRENT, and
NONCURRENT across countries in the overall sample for large corporations and for SMEs. The sample
period ranges from 2005 to 2015.
LEVERAGE TRADE CURRENT NONCURRENT N. observations
Belgium Mean (Large firms) 0.546 0.127 0.234 0.184 18,382
Median (Large firms) 0.592 0.058 0.154 0.063
Mean (SMEs) 0.629 0.182 0.274 0.168 413,773
Median (SMEs) 0.657 0.113 0.211 0.080
Spain Mean (Large firms) 0.670 0.097 0.276 0.292 40,320
Median (Large firms) 0.710 0.040 0.213 0.198
Mean (SMEs) 0.671 0.118 0.308 0.242 1,109,391
Median (SMEs) 0.703 0.034 0.247 0.158
France Mean (Large firms) 0.640 0.174 0.288 0.171 45,723
Median (Large firms) 0.657 0.130 0.229 0.082
Mean (SMEs) 0.671 0.234 0.319 0.113 1,816,761
Median (SMEs) 0.669 0.196 0.274 0.040
United Kingdom Mean (Large firms) 0.710 0.063 0.308 0.334 68,520
Median (Large firms) 0.710 0.015 0.216 0.193
Mean (SMEs) 0.748 0.131 0.334 0.263 302,652
Median (SMEs) 0.667 0.074 0.249 0.096
Italy Mean (Large firms) 0.658 0.163 0.302 0.192 59,655
Median (Large firms) 0.709 0.123 0.260 0.127
Mean (SMEs) 0.771 0.239 0.341 0.191 2,121,620
Median (SMEs) 0.840 0.186 0.291 0.122
Portugal Mean (Large firms) 0.693 0.127 0.247 0.314 8,433
Median (Large firms) 0.710 0.066 0.188 0.226
Mean (SMEs) 0.723 0.211 0.247 0.262 231,692
Median (SMEs) 0.730 0.169 0.199 0.194
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Table 6: Sources of Finance for Active and Defaulted SMEs and Large Firms
This table shows summary statistics for the variables representing the alternative sources of finance for
active and defaulted SMEs and large firms. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;
TRADE is the ratio of trade payables to total assets; CURRENT is the ratio of current liabilities (minus
trade payables) to total assets; and NONCURRENT is the ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets.
Panel B reports the difference between median values of active and defaulted SMEs and large firms.
Statistical significance is calculated using the Wilcoxon test. The number of firm-year observations per
group is 237,825 for Active large corporations; 3,208 for Insolvent and Bankrupt large corporations;
5,858,702 for Active SMEs; and 137,187 for Insolvent and Bankrupt SMEs. The sample period ranges
from 2005 to 2015. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
Panel A
Mean Median SD Min Max
Active large
LEVERAGE 0.661 0.689 0.318 0.002 4.470
TRADE 0.122 0.064 0.154 0.000 0.917
CURRENT 0.289 0.223 0.250 0.000 1.927
NONCURRENT 0.247 0.134 0.286 0.000 2.616
Defaulted large
LEVERAGE 0.868 0.901 0.424 0.002 4.470
TRADE 0.121 0.049 0.172 0.000 0.917
CURRENT 0.372 0.300 0.319 0.000 1.927
NONCURRENT 0.370 0.262 0.373 0.000 2.616
Active SMEs
LEVERAGE 0.703 0.734 0.301 0.002 4.470
TRADE 0.203 0.150 0.202 0.000 0.917
CURRENT 0.316 0.263 0.242 0.000 1.927
NONCURRENT 0.180 0.096 0.227 0.000 2.616
Defaulted SMEs
LEVERAGE 0.965 0.943 0.390 0.002 4.470
TRADE 0.267 0.206 0.252 0.000 0.917
CURRENT 0.470 0.417 0.317 0.000 1.927
NONCURRENT 0.235 0.120 0.294 0.000 2.616
Panel B: Median differences
Large firms SMEs SMEs - Large
Defaulted - Active Defaulted - Active Active Defaulted
LEVERAGE 0.212*** 0.210*** 0.045*** 0.043***
TRADE -0.015*** 0.056*** 0.086*** 0.157***
CURRENT 0.077*** 0.154*** 0.040*** 0.117***



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Default Probability: Regression Results
This table reports the estimated coefficients for the logit regressions and their robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level (in parentheses). The bottom of the table reports the number of observations,
number of clusters (i.e., firms), McFadden’s R2, and the percentage of correctly classified observations.
The dependent variable takes a value of 0 if the firm is Active and a value of 1 if it is either Insolvent or
Bankrupt. GDP is the 1-year GDP growth rate; GOVBOND is the 3-month government bond interest
rate; SOVCDS is the logarithm of the CDS price of government bonds; NITA is the ratio of net income
to total assets; CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets; AGE is the number of days since
incorporation divided by 365; SME is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s total assets are
worth no more than e43 million; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; TRADE is the
ratio of trade payables to total assets; CURRENT is the ratio of current liabilities (minus trade payables)
to total assets; and NONCURRENT is the ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets. Independent
variables are lagged. The sample period ranges from 2005 to 2015. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

















SME 0.348*** 0.163*** 0.334*** -0.014
(0.021) (0.046) (0.021) (0.052)
GDP -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GOVBOND 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.067***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SOVCDS 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.133*** 0.133***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NITA -4.237*** -4.236*** -3.692*** -3.688***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
CATA 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.197*** 0.205***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
AGE -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -5.863*** -5.683*** -6.090*** -5.760***
(0.043) (0.057) (0.043) (0.062)
Observations 6,219,574 6,219,574 6,219,574 6,219,574
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 940,861 940,861 940,861 940,861
Pseudo-R2 0.0890 0.0891 0.100 0.101
% Insolvent and Bankrupt correctly classified 68.133 68.121 68.996 68.951
% Active correctly classified 69.757 69.795 69.960 70.048
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Table 9: Default Probability: Average Marginal Effects
The table shows average marginal effects of LEVERAGE, TRADE, CURRENT, and NONCURRENT
for both SMEs and large corporations (Panel A). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard
errors of marginal effects are calculated using the delta method. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total
liabilities to total assets; TRADE is the ratio of trade payables to total assets; CURRENT is the ratio of
current liabilities (minus trade payables) to total assets; and NONCURRENT is the ratio of non-current
liabilities to total assets. Average marginal effects of LEVERAGE are computed using specification (2).
Average marginal effects of TRADE, CURRENT, and NONCURRENT are computed using specification
(4) of Table 8. Panel B reports differences in average marginal effects between SMEs and large firms.
Statistical significance is calculated using the Wald test.
LEVERAGE TRADE CURRENT NONCURRENT N. observations
Panel A
Large firms 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 240,538
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
SMEs 0.012*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.006*** 5,979,036
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B: SMEs - Large firms
0.006*** 0.021*** 0.019*** -0.002**
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Table 10: Predicted Default Probabilities
This table reports average predicted probabilities of default expressed as a percentage computed using
specification (4). Predicted probabilities are sorted according to different quartiles of LEVERAGE,
TRADE, CURRENT, and NONCURRENT. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;
TRADE is the ratio of trade payables to total assets; CURRENT is the ratio of current liabilities (minus
trade payables) to total assets; and NONCURRENT is the ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets.
The last column reports a Wald test on the difference between means of the fourth and the first quartiles.
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
First quartile Second quartile Third quartile Fourth quartile ∆Fourth−First
LEVERAGE
All sample 0.90*** 1.38*** 1.91*** 3.72*** 2.82***
Large firms 0.65*** 0.85*** 1.11*** 1.90*** 1.24***
SMEs 0.91*** 1.40*** 1.94*** 3.79*** 2.87***
TRADE
All sample 1.67*** 1.54*** 1.86*** 2.85*** 1.18***
Large firms 1.23*** 1.08*** 1.06*** 1.14*** -0.08***
SMEs 1.69*** 1.57*** 1.89*** 2.89*** 1.20***
CURRENT
All sample 1.28*** 1.47*** 1.82*** 3.34*** 2.06***
Large firms 0.98*** 0.96*** 1.07*** 1.50*** 0.52***
SMEs 1.30*** 1.49*** 1.85*** 3.41*** 2.12***
NONCURRENT
All sample 2.07*** 1.94*** 1.86*** 2.05*** -0.03***
Large firms 0.92*** 0.96*** 1.04*** 1.59*** 0.67***
SMEs 2.11*** 1.98*** 1.89*** 2.08*** -0.03***
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Table 11: Sources of Finance for Recovered and Defaulted SMEs and Large Firms
This table shows summary statistics for the variables representing the alternative sources of finance for
Insolvent firms at t − 1. Panel A reports summary statistics for recovered and defaulted SMEs and
large firms. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; TRADE is the ratio of trade
payables to total assets; CURRENT is the ratio of current liabilities (minus trade payables) to total
assets and NONCURRENT is the ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets. Panel B reports the
difference between median values of active and defaulted SMEs and large firms. Statistical significance
is calculated with the Wilcoxon test. The number of firm-year observations for recovered large firms;
Insolvent and Bankrupt large corporations; recovered SMEs; and Insolvent and Bankrupt SMEs is 17;
495; 313; and 16,885, respectively. The sample period ranges from 2005 to 2015. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05;
* p<0.1.
Panel A
Mean Median S. Min Max
Recovered large
LEVERAGE 1.092 1.055 0.328 0.584 1.580
TRADE 0.049 0.016 0.076 0.000 0.280
CURRENT 0.513 0.495 0.384 0.009 1.022
NONCURRENT 0.435 0.300 0.371 0.003 1.006
Defaulted large
LEVERAGE 0.946 0.917 0.317 0.002 2.169
TRADE 0.109 0.041 0.166 0.000 0.917
CURRENT 0.410 0.354 0.313 0.000 1.160
NONCURRENT 0.428 0.402 0.320 0.000 1.847
Recovered SMEs
LEVERAGE 1.061 0.986 0.339 0.158 1.893
TRADE 0.175 0.096 0.209 0.000 0.893
CURRENT 0.395 0.321 0.316 0.002 1.216
NONCURRENT 0.470 0.430 0.337 0.000 1.006
Defaulted SMEs
LEVERAGE 1.055 0.971 0.385 0.031 4.470
TRADE 0.248 0.180 0.236 0.000 0.917
CURRENT 0.469 0.394 0.336 0.000 1.927
NONCURRENT 0.346 0.274 0.306 0.000 2.616
Panel B: Comparisons
Large firms SMEs SMEs - Large
Defaulted - Recovered Defaulted - Recovered Recovered Defaulted
LEVERAGE -0.137* -0.015 -0.069 0.054***
TRADE 0.025* 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.139***
CURRENT -0.141 0.073*** -0.174 0.040***
NONCURRENT 0.103 -0.156*** 0.131 -0.128***
Table 12: Recovery Probability for SMEs: Regression Results
This table shows the estimated coefficients of logit regressions run on the sub-sample of Insolvent or
Bankrupt SME firms to estimate their recovery probability, that is, the probability that these firms
migrate to the Active state. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses.
The bottom of the table reports the number of observations, the number of clusters (i.e., firms), McFad-
den’s R2, and the percentage of correctly classified observations. The dependent variable takes a value
of 0 if the firm is either Insolvent or Bankrupt and a value of 1 if it is Active. The regression is estimated
on the sub-sample of Insolvent SMEs at t − 1. GDP is the 1-year GDP growth rate; GOVBOND is
the 3-month government bond interest rate; SOVCDS is the logarithm of the CDS price of government
bonds; NITA is the ratio of net income to total assets; CATA is the ratio of current assets to total
assets; AGE is the number of days since incorporation divided by 365; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total
liabilities to total assets; TRADE is the ratio of trade payables to total assets; CURRENT is the ratio of
current liabilities (minus trade payables) to total assets; and NONCURRENT is the ratio of non-current
liabilities to total assets. Independent variables are lagged. The sample period ranges from 2005 to 2015.

























Country FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Clusters 5,032 5,032
Pseudo-R2 0.359 0.359
% correctly classified Insolvent and Bankrupt SMEs 80.331 80.338
% correctly classified Active firms 92.121 92.121
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Table 13: Predicted Recovery Probabilities for SMEs
This table reports average predicted probabilities of recovery for SMEs expressed as a percentage com-
puted using specification (2a) of Table 12. Predicted probabilities of recovery are sorted for different
quartiles of LEVERAGE, TRADE, CURRENT, and NONCURRENT. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total
liabilities to total assets; TRADE is the ratio of trade payables to total assets; CURRENT is the ratio of
current liabilities (minus trade payables) to total assets; and NONCURRENT is the ratio of non-current
liabilities to total assets. The last column reports a Wald test on the difference between means of the
fourth and the first quartiles. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
First quartile Second quartile Third quartile Fourth quartile ∆Fourth−First
LEVERAGE
2.02*** 2.01*** 2.33*** 2.33*** 0.31**
TRADE
3.51*** 1.99*** 1.67*** 1.52*** -1.99***
CURRENT
2.89*** 2.11*** 1.97*** 1.71*** -1.18***
NONCURRENT













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 15: Loan Spreads
This table reports loan spreads when default probabilities are estimated using specification (4) in Table
8. “Low leverage” firms belong to the first decile of our sample ranked according to leverage, whereas
“High-leverage” firms belong to the tenth decile. SME (5M) denotes SMEs with annual sales below e5
million. “PDs” refers to the probability of default; del is the expected loss component of the spread; dul
is the unexpected loss component of the spread; and del + dul is the total loan spread. All values are
expressed as a percentage.
Low Leverage High Leverage ∆High−Low
Large SME(5M) ∆ Large SME(5M) ∆ Large SME(5M)
PD 0.62 0.76 0.15 2.55 5.74 3.19 1.93 4.97
del 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.50 1.13 0.63 0.38 0.98
dul 0.29 0.25 -0.04 0.52 0.53 0.00 0.23 0.27
del + dul 0.41 0.40 -0.01 1.02 1.65 0.63 0.61 1.25
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Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Leverage
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on the default probability of both large cor-
porations and SMEs computed using specification (2). Vertical lines represent average LEVERAGE
values for large corporations (dash-dotted line) and SMEs (solid line). LEVERAGE is the ratio of total
liabilities to total assets. Confidence intervals are reported at the 99% level.
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Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Leverage across Sectors
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on the default probability of both large corpo-
rations and SMEs for different sectors computed using specification (2). Vertical lines represent average
LEVERAGE values for large corporations (dash-dotted line) and SMEs (solid line). LEVERAGE is the
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Confidence intervals are reported at the 99% level.
(a) Production (b) Services
(c) Retail (d) Construction
(e) Transportation
Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Leverage across Countries
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on the default probability of both large corpora-
tions and SMEs for different countries computed using specification (2). Vertical lines represent average
LEVERAGE values for large corporations (dash-dotted line) and SMEs (solid line). LEVERAGE is the
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Confidence intervals are reported at the 99% level.
(a) Belgium (b) Spain
(c) France (d) United Kingdom
(e) Italy (f) Portugal
Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Leverage over Time
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on the default probability of both large cor-
porations and SMEs for three different time periods computed using specification (2). Vertical lines
represent average LEVERAGE values for large corporations (dash-dotted line) and SMEs (solid line).
LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Confidence intervals are reported at the 99%
level.




A Trade Credit and Default Risk
In this appendix, we seek to reconcile our finding of a positive relationship between trade
credit and default risk with the findings of McGuinness et al. (2018), who reach the op-
posite conclusion and suggest that trade credit is negatively related to default risk. We
conclude that the result in McGuinness et al. (2018) may follow because they indirectly
identify bankruptcy through an “unconditional” Z-score rather than directly and in a
model-free manner, as we do, by assigning a default status to companies when they are
actually insolvent or bankrupt.
Although the Z-score has been proven to be an accurate default predictor (Altman,
1968, Altman et al., 1977, Altman, 2000 and Altman and Sabato, 2007), its ability to
discriminate between active and defaulted companies may deteriorate with an uncondi-
tional version of the score, that is, when the weights of its risk factors and the score’s
default threshold have not been adjusted for country, industry, and time effects. Indeed,
default risk is sensitive to all such effects (Nickell et al., 2000); these effects are implicitly
accounted for in our model where observed insolvent and bankrupt firms are employed.
On the other hand, the Z-score in McGuinness et al. (2018) was estimated by Altman
(1993) using a sample of U.S. private firms. As a result, that score may not be well
calibrated for the sample of European firms from 2003 to 2012 analysed in McGuinness
et al. (2018).
To test whether the switch in the sign of trade finance is due to the specification of
the default prediction model, we use the same set of independent variables to predict
both our default indicator derived with actual insolvency/bankruptcy observations and
the 1993 Z-score-based default indicator in McGuinness et al. (2018). Table A.1 presents
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the results of our comparison. Trade credit exhibits opposite signs when the two default
indicators (actual vs. estimated) are used and is highly statistically significant in both
cases. Trade credit is positive when we employ actual insolvent and bankrupt firms to
identify companies in distress, which confirms our main findings in Table 8. It is negative
when the 1993 Altman Z-score is used. As robustness tests, we restrict the period of our
original sample to 2005–2012 to match, as closely as possible, that in McGuinness et al.
(2003–2012). Furthermore, we extend our country coverage by adding Finland, Germany,
Greece, and Ireland, as in McGuinness et al. (2018), but excluding Hungary, Latvia, and
Poland, for which data are either not available or of poor quality. For the added countries
(Finland, Germany, Greece, and Ireland), we have incomplete firm status data.20 Our ro-
bustness tests confirm the switched sign for trade finance from positive to negative when
the Z-score is used. Table A.2 further illustrates this sign switch. The table shows that
the average ratio of trade credit to total assets falls (from 23.2% to 16.2%) as firms enter
the Z-score default area, that is, when the Z-score takes a value below 1.23. In contrast,
average trade credit over total assets increases (from 21.3% to 27.4%) when active firms
become distressed.
The results can be explained by the poor discriminative power of an unconditional
Z-score. Table A.3 shows that, although the proportion of insolvent companies in the
distress area of the Z-score is higher than in the non-distress area, it is still rather small,
at 5.05%. Furthermore, the distress area of the Z-score can only capture 52.1% of the in-
solvent firms in our sample. This means that 47.9% of the insolvent firms are incorrectly
classified as active by the Z-score.
20This is the reason we exclude those countries from our main analysis.
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Table A.1: Trade Finance and Actual versus Estimated Default Indicators
This table reports logit regressions using the sample in our paper and the SME definition in McGuinness
et al. (2018). The sample has been restricted to include only firms for which all the dependent and
independent variables in McGuinness et al.’s (2018) model 5 in their Table 6 are available. In columns
(1) and (2) the sample period is 2005–2015, and the countries included are Belgium, Spain, France, Italy,
Portugal, and the United Kingdom, as in our previous analysis. In columns (3) and (4), the sample
period is restricted to 2005–2012. In columns (5) and (6), the sample period is restricted to 2005–2012,
and we add Finland, Germany, Greece, and Ireland to the pool of countries. In columns (1), (3), and (5),
the dependent variable takes a value of 0 if the firm is Active and a value of 1 if it is either Insolvent or
Bankrupt, as in our previous analysis. In columns (2), (4), and (6), the dependent variable takes a value
of 0 if the firm has a Z-score equal or above 1.23 and a value of 1 if the firm has a Z-score below 1.23, as
in McGuinness et al. (2018). Independent variables are lagged. Robust standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2005-2014 2005-2012 Additional Countries - 2005-2012
Actual Default Estimated Default Actual Default Estimated Default Actual Default Estimated Default
TRADE 1.535*** -1.755*** 1.507*** -1.865*** 1.515*** -1.901***
(0.026) (0.018) (0.029) (0.019) (0.029) (0.019)
Ln(ASSETS) -0.066*** 0.460*** -0.078*** 0.460*** -0.076*** 0.464***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
SALES GROWTH -0.311*** 0.022*** -0.183*** 0.030*** -0.179*** 0.032***
(0.027) (0.001) (0.019) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002)
CASH -3.796*** -7.174*** -4.240*** -6.831*** -4.200*** -6.766***
(0.064) (0.046) (0.076) (0.047) (0.075) (0.046)
AGE -0.041*** -0.032*** -0.045*** -0.035*** -0.040*** -0.033***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE2 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lerner Index 7.634*** -4.719*** 6.473*** -5.121*** 6.124*** -3.177***
(0.834) (0.407) (0.891) (0.458) (0.876) (0.442)
Constant -11.271*** 1.401*** -9.957*** 1.837*** -9.665*** -0.102
(0.814) (0.398) (0.868) (0.448) (0.853) (0.434)
Observations 2,520,133 2,520,133 1,842,015 1,842,015 1,931,011 1,931,011
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 573,834 573,834 520,805 520,805 549,719 549,719
Pseudo-R2 0.0464 0.214 0.0507 0.215 0.0525 0.216
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Table A.2: Average Trade Credit for Active and Defaulted Firms: Actual versus Esti-
mated
This table reports the average value of trade credit over total assets (TRADE) for active and defaulted
firms, when firm status (default/active) is observed and when it is estimated using a Z-score as in
McGuinness et al. (2018). The sample period is 2005-2014, and the countries included are Belgium,
Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.
Estimated active firms Estimated defaulted firms
Z-score ≥ 1.23 Z-score < 1.23
TRADE (%) 23.2 16.2
Active firms - actual Defaulted firms - actual
TRADE (%) 21.3 27.4
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Table A.3: The “Unconditional” Z-Score’s Discriminant Ability
This table describes the ability of the “unconditional” Z-score used in McGuinness et al. (2018) to
discriminate between active and defaulted companies. The sample period is 2005-2015, and the countries
included are Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.
a = DefaultedTotal EstimatedActive or Defaulted Firms ; b =
Defaulted
TotalDefaulted
Estimated active firms Estimated defaulted firms
Z-score ≥ 1.23 Z-score < 1.23
Active (actual) 1,879,688 581,213
Defaulted (actual) 28,349 30,883
a (%) 1.49 5.05
b (%) 47.86 52.14
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B Additional Tables
Table B.1: Definition of Status Field
This table reports definitions of Orbis’s “status” field. We define firm-year observations as Active if the
“status” is “Active”; as Insolvent if the “status” is “Active default of payment”, “Active rescue plan”,
or “Active insolvency proceedings”; and as Bankrupt if the “status” is “Bankruptcy”, “In liquidation”
or “Dissolved”.
Orbis Definition of Status Description
Active The company has not defaulted.
Active default of payment The company has defaulted, but it is still a going concern.
Active rescue plan The company is active and has not defaulted but sought
protection from its creditors to have time to reorganise.
There are no formal insolvency proceedings. Typical in
France (“Procedure de sauvegarde”).
Active insolvency proceedings The company is insolvent but is still active. Similar to
Chapter 11 in the United States.
Bankruptcy The company is declared bankrupt.
In liquidation The company is under liquidation, not necessarily because
of bankruptcy. A company may be liquidated because of
voluntary dissolution, for instance.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.3: Default Probability: Effect of Current Assets
This table reports the estimated coefficients of logit regressions and their robust standard errors clustered
at the firm level (in parentheses). The bottom of the table reports the number of observations, number
of clusters (i.e., firms), McFadden’s R2, and the percentage of correctly classified observations. The
dependent variable takes a value of 0 if the firm is Active and a value of 1 if it is either Insolvent or
Bankrupt. GDP is the 1-year GDP growth rate; GOVBOND is the 3-month government bond interest
rate; SOVCDS is the logarithm of the CDS price of government bonds; NITA is the ratio of net income
to total assets; STOCKTA is the ratio of inventories to total assets; DEBTORSTA is the ratio of trade
receivable to total assets; CASHTA is the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets; OTHERCATA
is the ratio of all current assets not included in STOCKTA, DEBTORSTA, and CASHTA to total assets;
AGE is the number of days since incorporation divided by 365; SME is a dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 if a firm’s total assets are worth no more than e43 million; and LEVERAGE is the ratio of
total liabilities to total assets. Independent variables are lagged. The sample period ranges from 2005

































We calculate the marginal effects of LEVERAGE, TRADE, CURRENT, and NON-
CURRENT on the probabilities of default across different levels of the independent vari-
ables as our estimated logistic function is non-linear in nature. In addition, we cannot
directly interpret the sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of coefficients of terms
interacted with dummy variables (Ai and Norton, 2003).
Marginal effects in specifications (1) and (3) of Table 8, where there is no interaction




′(α +Xi,tβ +Zi,c,tδ + γc + γj). (C.1)
Marginal effects in specifications (3) and (4), where variables of interest interact with
the SME dummy are:
∂Pt(yi,c,j,t+1 = 1)
∂x
= (βx + βx·SMESME)Φ
′(α +Xi,tβ +Zi,c,tδ + γc + γj), (C.2)
where x is the variable of interest (LEVERAGE, TRADE, CURRENT, or NON-
CURRENT). In non-linear models, independent variables affect marginal effects of the
variable of interest. We choose to evaluate marginal effects at the mean values of the two
subgroups (SMEs and large corporations).
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D Basel III Formula
In this appendix, we report the Basel III capital requirement calculations that we employ








b = (0.11852− 0.05478ln(PD))2 (D.2)
MA =





















K = 12.5·K· 1.06·EAD, (D.5)
where R stands for correlation; PD is the probability of default; b is a calibrated
parameter; MA is the maturity adjustment; M is the “effective” maturity of the loan
estimated as its Macaulay duration with the discount rate set to 0; K is the capital
requirement; LGD is the loss given default; and EAD is the exposure at default. N is
the normal cumulative function, and G is its inverse.
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E Robustness Tests
Figure E.1: Marginal Effects of Leverage, Excluding Low Leverage Firms
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on the default probability of both large cor-
porations and SMEs computed using specification (2). We exclude observations in the bottom 10% of
the LEVERAGE distribution. Vertical lines represent average LEVERAGE values for large corporations
(dash-dotted line) and SMEs (solid line). LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
Confidence intervals are reported at the 99% level.
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Figure E.2: Marginal Effects of Leverage with a Quadratic Term
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on the default probability of both large corpo-
rations and SMEs computed using specification (2). We include a LEVERAGE quadratic term and a
LEVERAGE quadratic term interacted with the SMEs dummy. Vertical lines represent average LEVER-
AGE values for large corporations (dash-dotted line) and SMEs (solid line). LEVERAGE is the ratio of
total liabilities to total assets. Confidence intervals are reported at the 99% level.
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Figure E.3: Marginal Effects of Leverage with an Ordered Logit Model
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on the default probability of large corporations
and SMEs computed using specification (2). We use an ordered logit model, which distinguishes between
Active, Insolvent, and Bankrupt observations. Vertical lines represent the average LEVERAGE values
for large corporations (dash-dotted line) and SMEs (solid line). LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities
to total assets. Confidence intervals are reported at the 99% level.
(a) Large Corporations (b) SMEs
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Figure E.4: Marginal Effects of Leverage Using the European Commission’s SME Defi-
nition
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on the default probability of large corporations
and SMEs computed using specification (2). SMEs are defined according to the European Commission’s
definition. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Vertical lines represent average
LEVERAGE values for large corporations (dash-dotted line) and SMEs (solid line). Confidence intervals
are reported at the 99% level.
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Figure E.5: Marginal Effects of Leverage, Excluding Italy
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on the default probability of large corporations
and SMEs computed using specification (2). Observations from Italy are excluded. LEVERAGE is the
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Vertical lines represent average LEVERAGE values for large
corporations (dash-dotted line) and SMEs (solid line). Confidence intervals are reported at the 99%
level.
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Figure E.6: Marginal Effects of Leverage, Excluding the Retail Sector
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on the default probability of large corporations
and SMEs computed using specification (2). Observations from the retail sector are excluded. LEVER-
AGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Vertical lines represent average LEVERAGE values
for large corporations (dash-dotted line) and SMEs (solid line). Confidence intervals are reported at the
99% level.
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Figure E.7: Marginal Effects of Leverage along Firm Dimensions
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on the default probability of large corporations
medium, and small firms computed using specification (2). LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities
to total assets. Vertical lines represent average LEVERAGE values for large corporations (dash-dotted
line), medium firms (solid line), and SMEs (dotted line). Confidence intervals are reported at the 99%
level.
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Figure E.8: Marginal Effects of Leverage and Time Fixed Effects
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on default probability with specification (2) and
time fixed effects. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Vertical lines represent
average LEVERAGE values for large corporations (dash-dotted line) and SMEs (solid line). Confidence
intervals are reported at the 99% level.
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Figure E.9: Additional Robustness
This figure presents the marginal effects of LEVERAGE on the default probability of large corporations
and SMEs computed using specification (2) of Equation 1, with control variables and their interaction
with LEVERAGE added one at a time. Predicted probabilities are sorted according to different quartiles
of LEVERAGE. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; Small Business Act (SBA) is
a dummy variable that identifies country-years where the number of SBA-related interventions is above
the median number of interventions across all country-years in the sample; Partnerships/Sole Traders
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is not a partnerships or a sole trader; Financial
Constraints is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm has a probability of being financially
constrained above the sample median probability; Net Income Growth is a dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 if a firm’s net income growth is above the sample’s median net income growth; Asset Growth
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm has an asset growth above the sample median
asset growth; Secured Creditors and Absolute Priority is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the
legislation of the country mandates secured creditors to be paid first in case of default and Creditors’
Restrictions on Reorganisation is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the legislation of the country
allows creditors to restrict reorganisation in cases of default. Vertical lines represent average LEVERAGE
values for large corporations (dash-dotted lines) and SMEs (solid lines). Confidence intervals are reported
at the 99% level.
(a) Small Business Act (b) Partnerships/Sole Traders (c) Financial Constraints























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table E.2: Additional Robustness: Predicted Default Probabilities
This table reports average predicted probabilities of default expressed as a percentage computed with
specification (2) of Equation 1, adding control variables and their interaction with LEVERAGE one at
a time. Predicted probabilities are sorted for different quartiles of LEVERAGE. LEVERAGE is the
ratio of total liabilities to total assets; Small Business Act (SBA) is a dummy variable that we use to
identify country-years in which the number of SBA-related interventions is above the median number
of interventions across all country-years in the sample; Partnerships/Sole Traders is a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 if a firm is not a partnership or a sole trader; Financial Constraints is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm has a probability of being financially constrained above the
sample median probability; Net Income Growth is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s
net income growth is above the sample median’s net income growth; Assets Growth is a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s asset growth is above the sample median’s asset growth; Secured
Creditors and Absolute Priority is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the legislation of the
country mandates that secured creditors to be paid first in case of default; and Creditors’ Restrictions
on Reorganisation is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the legislation of the country allows
creditors to restrict reorganisation in cases of default. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
First Quartile Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile ∆Fourth−First
Panel A: Small Business Act (SBA) Interventions
Low Number of SBA Interventions
All Sample 1.118*** 1.523*** 1.993*** 4.154*** 3.036***
Large Firms 0.593*** 0.804*** 1.133*** 2.042*** 1.449 ***
SMEs 1.144*** 1.551*** 2.022*** 4.235*** 3.092***
High Number of SBA Interventions
All Sample 0.892*** 1.343*** 1.912*** 3.922*** 3.030***
Large Firms 0.494*** 0.718*** 1.060*** 1.860*** 1.366***
SMEs 0.915*** 1.373*** 1.948*** 3.997*** 3.082***
High Number of SBA Interventions - Low Number of SBA Interventions
All Sample -0.227*** -0.181*** -0.082*** -0.232***
Large Firms -0.099*** -0.087*** -0.074*** -0.181***
SMEs -0.229*** -0.178*** -0.074*** -0.238***
Panel B: Partnerships/Sole Traders
Partnerships/Sole Traders
All Sample 0.832*** 1.151*** 1.536*** 3.405*** 2.573***
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First Quartile Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile ∆Fourth−First
Large Firms 0.597*** 0.754*** 0.945*** 1.971*** 1.375***
SMEs 0.847*** 1.175*** 1.561*** 3.439*** 2.592***
Other Firms
All Sample 1.100*** 1.466*** 1.88*** 3.494*** 2.395***
Large Firms 0.689*** 0.863*** 1.115*** 1.853*** 1.164***
SMEs 1.121*** 1.492*** 1.913*** 3.557*** 2.436***
Other Firms - Partnerships/Sole Traders
All Sample 0.268*** 0.315*** 0.348*** 0.089***
Large Firms 0.092*** 0.108*** 0.170*** -0.118*
SMEs 0.274*** 0.317*** 0.353*** 0.118***
Panel C: Financial Constraints
Less Likely Financially Constrained
All Sample 0.592*** 0.932*** 1.362*** 3.022*** 2.430***
Large Firms 0.307*** 0.431*** 0.621*** 1.197*** 0.890***
SMEs 0.604*** 0.948*** 1.386*** 3.087*** 2.483***
More Likely Financially Constrained
All Sample 1.173*** 1.598*** 2.164*** 4.564*** 3.390***
Large Firms 0.643*** 0.816*** 1.089*** 2.144*** 1.501***
SMEs 1.221*** 1.646*** 2.216*** 4.658*** 2.483***
More Likely Financially Constrained - Less Likely Financially Constrained
All Sample 0.582*** 0.666*** 0.802*** 1.542***
Large Firms 0.336*** 0.385*** 0.468*** 0.948***
SMEs 0.617*** 0.698*** 0.830*** 1.572***
Panel D: Net Income Growth
Slow Growing Net Income
All Sample 1.151*** 1.659*** 2.170*** 3.903*** 2.752***
79
First Quartile Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile ∆Fourth−First
Large Firms 0.694*** 0.921*** 1.203*** 1.893*** 1.199***
SMEs 1.176 1.692 2.209 3.975 2.799***
Fast Growing Net Income
All Sample 0.878*** 1.127*** 1.502*** 3.404*** 2.526***
Large Firms 0.575*** 0.671*** 0.897*** 1.750*** 1.175***
SMEs 0.894*** 1.147*** 1.527*** 3.478*** 2.584***
Fast Growing Net Income - Slow Growing Net Income
All Sample -0.273*** -0.532*** -0.668*** -0.499***
Large Firms -0.120*** -0.249*** -0.306*** -0.143***
SMEs -0.282*** -0.545*** -0.682*** -0.496***
Panel E: Assets Growth
Slow Growing Assets
All Sample 1.240*** 1.689*** 2.220*** 4.879*** 3.639***
Large Firms 0.785*** 0.961*** 1.267*** 2.382*** 1.597***
SMEs 1.264*** 1.718*** 2.259*** 4.987*** 3.724***
Fast Growing Assets
All Sample 0.742*** 1.106*** 1.537*** 2.605*** 1.863***
Large Firms 0.464*** 0.612*** 0.827*** 1.226*** 0.762***
SMEs 0.758*** 1.128*** 1.565*** 2.652*** 1.894***
Fast Growing Assets - Slow Growing Assets
All Sample -0.498*** -0.580*** -0.682*** -2.274***
Large Firms -0.321*** -0.349*** -0.440*** -1.156***
SMEs -0.505*** -0.590*** -0.694*** -2.335***
Panel F: Secured Creditors and Absolute Priority
Secured Creditor Not Paid First
All Sample 0.633*** 1.153*** 1.861*** 4.153*** 3.520***
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First Quartile Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile ∆Fourth−First
Large Firms 0.339*** 0.657*** 1.131*** 2.424*** 2.085***
SMEs 0.645*** 1.170*** 1.884*** 4.196*** 3.551***
Secured Creditor Paid First
All Sample 1.459*** 1.656*** 1.830*** 3.125*** 1.666***
Large Firms 0.924*** 0.961*** 1.082*** 1.560*** 0.636***
SMEs 1.515*** 1.718*** 1.893*** 3.323*** 1.808***
Secured Creditor Paid First - Secured Creditor Not Paid First
All Sample 0.826*** 0.503*** -0.031*** -1.028***
Large Firms 0.585*** 0.304*** -0.049*** -0.865***
SMEs 0.870*** 0.548*** 0.009*** -0.873***
Panel G: Creditors’ Restrictions on Reorganization
Creditors Cannot Restrict Reorganization
All Sample 0.863*** 1.338*** 1.895*** 4.427*** 3.563***
Large Firms 0.516*** 0.788*** 1.177*** 2.252*** 1.737***
SMEs 0.877*** 1.356*** 1.918*** 4.510*** 3.633***
Creditors Can Restrict Reorganization
All Sample 1.275*** 1.547*** 1.903*** 3.031*** 1.756***
Large Firms 0.740*** 0.877*** 1.084*** 1.681*** 0.940***
SMEs 1.320*** 1.592*** 1.940*** 3.081*** 1.761***
Creditors Can Restrict Reorganization - Creditors Cannot Restrict Reorganization
All Sample 0.412*** 0.210*** 0.008*** -1.395***
Large Firms 0.224*** 0.090*** -0.093*** -0.572***
SMEs 0.444*** 0.236*** 0.022*** -1.429***
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Table E.3: Loan Spreads: Equity Sensitivity Analysis
This table reports loan spreads when default probabilities are estimated using specification (4). “Low-
leverage” firms belong to the first decile of our sample ranked according to leverage, whereas “High-
leverage” firms belong to the tenth decile. SME (5M) denotes SMEs with annual sales below e5 million.
PD is the probability of default; del is the expected loss component of the spread; dul is the unexpected
loss component of the spread; and del + dul is the total loan spread. In Panel A, cost of equity (re) is
10%. In Panel B, cost of equity (re) is 15%. All values are expressed as a percentage.
Low Leverage High Leverage ∆High−Low
Large SMEs ∆ Large SMEs ∆ Large SMEs
Panel A: re = 10%
PD 0.62 0.76 0.15 2.55 5.74 3.19 1.93 4.97
del 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.50 1.13 0.63 0.38 0.98
dul 0.21 0.19 -0.03 0.38 0.39 0.00 0.17 0.20
del + dul 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.88 1.51 0.63 0.55 1.18
Panel B: re = 15%
PD 0.62 0.76 0.15 2.55 5.74 3.19 1.93 4.97
del 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.50 1.13 0.63 0.38 0.98
dul 0.32 0.28 -0.04 0.57 0.58 0.01 0.25 0.30
del + dul 0.44 0.43 -0.01 1.07 1.70 0.63 0.63 1.28
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